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THE PYGMALION EFFECT: AN AGENCY MODEL 





We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self-fulfilling prophecy, called the 
Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to 
succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to 
succeed). To this purpose, we extend a simple agency model with moral hazard and limited 
liability by introducing a model of reference dependent preferences (RDP) by Kőszegi and 
Rabin (2004). We show that the agent with high expectations about his performance can be 
induced to choose high effort with low-powered incentives. We then show that the principal’s 
expectation has an important role as an equilibrium selection device. 
JEL Code: B49, D82, M12, M52, M54. 
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1 Introduction
People (pupils, subordinates, and so on) tend to act in accordance with the
expectation of others (teachers, managers, and so on). In particular, the
former may, to some degree, internalize the higher expectations placed on
them by the latter, and then act in ways to fulﬁll those expectations. A
pioneering work by Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) shows, through their
experimental research, that a teacher’s expectation for a pupil’s intellec-
tual competence can come to serve as an educational self-fulﬁlling prophecy,
and names this phenomenon the Pygmalion eﬀect after Greek myths.1 Liv-
ingston (1969) discusses the Pygmalion eﬀect not in educational setting but
in managerial setting.2 He argues that (a) “what managers expect of sub-
ordinates and the way they treat them largely determine their performance
and career progress,” (b) “a unique characteristic of superior managers is
the ability to create high performance expectations that subordinates ful-
ﬁll,” (c) “less eﬀective managers fail to develop similar expectations, and
as a consequence, the productivity of their subordinates suﬀers,” and (d)
“subordinates, more often than not, appear to do what they believe they
are expected to do.” Since Livingston (1969), many researchers have been
1A series of research by Rosenthal and his collaborators studies the Pygmalion eﬀect
in educational setting. Jussim (1986) provides a theoretical model of the Pygmalion eﬀect
in the classroom.
2See also Goddard (1985).
2studying the Pygmalion eﬀect in business or military organizations. Kierein
and Gold (2000) and McNatt (2000) conduct meta-analysis of relevant stud-
ies within management contexts, and both ﬁnd that the Pygmalion eﬀect is
in general fairly strong.
F r o mt h e s ee x i s t i n gs t u d i e s ,w ec a ns u m m a r i z et h ew a yt h eP y g m a l i o n
eﬀect occurs as follows. A manager’s high expectation inﬂuences her attitude
toward her subordinates, and such attitude has positive eﬀects on subordi-
nates’ self-expectancy. The subordinates’ enhanced self-expectancy then im-
proves their performance. In this process, the part that a person’s enhanced
self-expectation improves his own performance is often called the Galatea
eﬀect. For example, Kierein and Gold (2000) explain the Galatea eﬀect as
one of other types of expectation eﬀects: “The Galatea eﬀect occurs not
when the leader has expectations of subordinates, but when subordinates’
raised expectations of themselves are realized in their higher performance.”
They however state that it is part of the Pygmalion eﬀect, and examine the
Pygmalion and Galatea eﬀects together in their meta-analysis.3
In this paper we attempt to formalize and explain both the Pygmalion
and the Galatea eﬀects. To this purpose, we extend a simple but standard
model of a principal and an agent with moral hazard and limited liability.
A key extension from this standard model is that the agent has reference
dependent preferences (henceforth RDP). What a person has PDP means
that his preferences are conditional on a reference point, and various anoma-
lies such as loss aversion, endowment eﬀects, status quo bias, and so on, are
consistent with RDP.4 More precisely, the payoﬀ depends on the realized
3On the other hand, McNatt (2000) seems to emphasize that the feature that a man-
ager’s expectation has the impact on her subordinate’s self-expectancy appears uniquely
in the Pygmalion eﬀect.
4The seminal paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explores issues on RDP. Re-
cently, various models of RDP have been developed. For example, Masatlioglu and Ok
(2003), Sagi (2004), and Sugden (2003) give axiomatic foundations for models of RDP.
3consumption as gain or loss relative to a reference level. What serves as
the reference point is thus crucial to the model with RDP. In this respect,
Masatlioglu and Ok (2003) and Sagi (2004) assume that the status quo serves
as the reference point, and Sugden (2003) considers the reference point as
one’s current endowment which is determined by a “reference lottery.” Note
that in these studies reference points are exogenously given.
Our model is built on a yet another model of RDP by K˝ oszegi and Rabin
(2004), which has the following two important features.5 First, a person’s
reference point is her recent expectation, represented by a probability mea-
sure, over outcomes.6 Second, the model by K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2004) has
a prominent feature that the reference point is endogenously determined by
the person’s rational expectation.7 To this end, they deﬁne the personal
equilibrium which requires that a person maximize his payoﬀ given his ra-
tional expectations about outcomes, and hence the expectations themselves
depend on his own anticipated behavior.
Following K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2004), we suppose that the agent’s utility
depends not only on his material payoﬀ, as in the standard model, but also
on the gain-loss payoﬀ which is deﬁned by the agent’s evaluation of his
consumption bundle as gains or losses relative to a reference point. The
reference point of the agent is his expectation about the eﬀort level chosen
by the agent and the resulting success probability of the project. We then
deﬁne the personal equilibrium that determines the agent’s reference point
endogenously. Our main contribution is to analyze interaction between RDP
5We give a brief sketch of their model in the next section.
6In this sense, their model is similar to that of Sugden (2003). In K˝ oszegi and Rabin
(2004), however, each outcome is compared to all outcomes in the support of the reference
lottery, while in Sugden (2003), an outcome is compared only to the outcome that would
have resulted from the reference lottery in the same state.
7Munro and Sugden (2003) and Falk and Knell (2004) also study the endogenous
determination of reference points.
4and incentives designed by the principal. We ﬁrst take a contract as given,
and analyze the agent’s personal equilibrium. We show that compared with
the standard model without RDP, the agent’s higher expectation enables
the principal to implement high eﬀort with lower-powered incentives. We
interpret this result as the Galatea eﬀect. We also show that when the power
of incentives is intermediate, multiple equilibria may exist. In this case the
agent’s expectations are self-fulﬁlling: he chooses high eﬀort if he expects
to do so, while he chooses low eﬀort if it is his expected eﬀort. We then
study the optimal contract solving the principal’s problem. The principal’s
contract aﬀects the agent’s personal equilibrium and hence his expectations.
Furthermore, the principal wants to make the agent attend to high eﬀort
in the region with multiple equilibria. In this respect, we can interpret
the Pygmalion eﬀect as the principal’s attempt to make the agent choose a
particular personal equilibrium.
Although we are unaware of any economic literature studying the Pyg-
malion eﬀect, there are possible alternative approaches to explaining this
eﬀect. First, there is a simple explanation that the principal with high ex-
pectation takes some explicit actions to improve the agent’s productivity.
This is nothing but the theory of human capital. In contrast to this expla-
nation, we consider the situation where the principal’s expectation implicitly
inﬂuences the agent’s performance. In other words, our model does not have
any component which directly aﬀects the agent’s productivity. The second,
more interesting approach is to focus on the role of information transmission
by the principal. When the agent does not know his own productivity, the
principal with high expectation may eﬀectively transmit her private informa-
tion on the agent’s productivity.8 B´ enabou and Tirole (2003) is an example
8Note that the principal’s mere expression of her expectation is not credible to the
agent, since it is just cheap talk.
5along this line. In their model, the principal’s policy (wage scheme) as a
signal informs the agent of his ability and then aﬀects his action: costly
signal from the principal serves as a motivational device for the agent. How-
ever, this kind of explanation disregards the crux of the Pygmalion eﬀect.
Firstly, the Pygmalion eﬀect works even when agents know their own abil-
ities without such informative signals. An experimental result illustrated
in Livingston (1969) shows this point. At an oﬃce of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, a manager decided to group his insurance agents
according to their abilities. Then, the performance of the top group which
consists of his best agents improved dramatically. However, the performance
of the middle group which consists of his average agents also signiﬁcantly
improved. Surprisingly, this group increased its productivity by a higher
percentage than the top group did. Secondly, B´ enabou and Tirole (2003)
assume that the agent devotes more eﬀort when he receives a good signal
that convinces him that his ability is high. That is, the Galatea eﬀect is ex-
ogenously given. In our model, in contrast to this signaling approach, there
is no information transmission, and both the Galatea and the Pygmalion
eﬀects are explained endogenously.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce
the model of RDP based on K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2004). In section 3 we build
a simple agency model with RDP. We analyze the personal equilibrium and
study the optimal incentive scheme in the same section. In section 4 we
extend our model to some directions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Reference Dependent Preferences
Following K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2004), we formulate the reference dependent
nature of preferences as the following way. Let c =( c1,...,c n)b eac o n -
6sumption bundle of an agent, and r =( r1,...,r n) be a reference consump-
tion bundle. We deﬁne the agent’s overall payoﬀ u(c | r)b y






zk(ck | rk), (1)
where v(c) is his material payoﬀ, as in standard models, and z(c | r)r e p r e -
sents the agent’s evaluation of his consumption bundle as gains and losses
relative to a reference point. We call this part of the agent’s payoﬀ as gain-
loss payoﬀ. (1) implies that each dimension of consumption is assumed to
be additively separable.
This model is extended to cases in which there is uncertainty in con-
sumption outcomes as well as reference points. Let F be the probablity
distribution function of consumption bundle c,a n dG be the distribution







We further assume that each dimension is evaluated by the same function





µ(vk(ck) − vk(rk)) (2)
The “universal” gain-loss function µ(·) is assumed to have the following
properties. They captures important features of how people evaluate gain
and loss from the reference point.
A0 µ(0) = 0 and µ (y) > 0.
A1 µ  (y) ≤ 0f o ry>0, and µ (y) > 0a n dµ  (y) ≥ 0f o ry<0.
A2 If y>y   > 0, µ(y) − µ(y ) <µ (−y ) − µ(−y)h o l d s .
A3 limy↑0 µ (y)/limy↓0 µ (y) ≡ γ>1.
7A1 represents diminishing sensitivity, implying that as the consumption level
moves further away from the reference level, the marginal valuation of gains
and losses decreases. And A2 and A3 capture loss aversion, A2 for “large”
stakes and A3 for marginal ones.
In the current version of the paper, we isolate the eﬀect of loss aversion
by assuming µ(·) is linear, and deﬁne
µ(vk(ck) − vk(rk)) =

α(vk(ck) − vk(rk)) if vk(ck) − vk(rk) > 0,
αγ(vk(ck) − vk(rk)) if vk(ck) − vk(rk) < 0,
(3)
where α, a positive constant, is the weight on the gain-loss payoﬀ, and γ>1
is the “coeﬃcient of loss aversion” which is the same as γ deﬁned in A3.
3 A Simple Agency Model
There are two risk neutral parties, a principal and an agent. The agent
engages in one project on behalf of the principal. The outcome of the project
is either success (s) or failure (f), and the probability distribution depends
on the agent’s eﬀort. We assume there are two feasible eﬀort levels e0 and
e1, and denote by pi the probability of success under eﬀort ei.9 We assume
0 <p 0 <p 1 < 1 and denote ∆p ≡ p1 − p0.
In the standard agency model, the agent’s payoﬀ depends on his “con-
sumption” bundle (w,ei)w h e r ew is remuneration received from the princi-
pal. Let v(w,ei)b eh i smaterial payoﬀ function, and assume it is additively
separable: v(w,ei)=w − di where di is the agent’s private cost of eﬀort
ei. For simplicity we assume d0 =0<d 1, and denote d = d1.U s i n g t h e
formulation introduced in Section 2, we extend this standard model as fol-
lows. Let (w,ej) be a reference point, and deﬁne the agent’s overall payoﬀ
u(w,ei | w,ej)b y
u(w,ei | w,ej)=w − di + µ(w − w)+µ(dj − di)( 4 )
9In Section 4, we consider a case where the eﬀort variable is continuous.
8where the gain-loss function µ(·) is deﬁned by (3).
The agent’s eﬀort is unobservable to the principal, while the outcome of
the project is veriﬁable. The principal can thus design an incentive compen-
sation scheme (bs,b f)w h e r ebi is remuneration paid from the principal to
the agent when outcome is i ∈{ s,f}. We assume that bi must satisfy the
limited liability constraint bi ≥ 0. We also denote the diﬀerence in payment
by ∆b = bs − bf.
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. The principal oﬀers a contract.
2. The agent either accepts or rejects the contract. If he rejects it, the
game ends and each of the parties receives the reservation payoﬀ zero.
If the agent accepts the contract, the game moves to the next stage.
3. The reference point of the agent is determined.10
4. The agent chooses eﬀort.
5. The outcome of the project realizes and the payment is made according
to the contract.
We now discuss how the agent’s reference point is determined. First, we
follow K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2004) by taking the standpoint that the reference
point is determined by the agent’s expectations about what he is going to get.
In most literature, the reference point of an individual is given exogenously
as his current or past endowments, while little is known both theoretically
and empirically concerning how the reference point is determined. K˝ oszegi
and Rabin (2004) argue that expectations play a central role in determining
reference points. For example, they argue that most existing empirical work
10Our results are not aﬀected by an alternative timing as long as the agent determines
his reference point after the principal oﬀers a contract and before he chooses eﬀort.
9on loss aversion, in which the status quo is exogenously given, can also be
interpreted in terms of expectations as reference points. Since we study the
eﬀects of expectations on performance, their formulation in particular ﬁts
well with our research agenda.
If we adopt the expectation-as-reference view and apply it to our agent,
the agent’s preferences depend on his expectations, which themselves depend
on his preferences. The agent with some predictive ability will take this
feedback into account, and will reach a state in which his expectations are
consistent with his eventual outcomes. Following K˝ oszegi and Rabin (2004),
we thus model the agent’s decision making in terms of an “equilibrium” as
follows.
Suppose that a compensation scheme (bs,b f) has been accepted by the
agent. The agent’s reference point consists of eﬀort ej he is expected to
choose, and the resulting probability distribution over (bs,b f), which is rep-
resented by the probability of success pj.T h e n( ej,p j)i sapersonal equilib-
rium if for i  = j,
U(ej,p j | ej,p j) ≥ U(ei,p i | ej,p j)( 5 )
where U(·) is the agent’s expected payoﬀ and is given by
U(ei,p i | ej,p j)=bf + pi∆b − di
+ pi(1 − pj)µ(∆b)+( 1− pi)pjµ(−∆b)
+ µ(dj − di).
(6)
The ﬁrst line of (6) is the expected material payoﬀ. The second and third
lines represent the gain-loss payoﬀ under reference point (ej,p j).11 For ex-
ample, suppose that the reference point is (e1,p 1), and the agent’s choice is
11Since pj is uniquely determined by ej, it is enough to deﬁne reference points and
equilibria in terms of eﬀort only. We however include the probability distribution in order
to emphasize the existence of gains and losses in terms of outcome-dependent payments.
10(e0,p 0). The agent enjoys gain αd (the third line) because he saves cost d by
not choosing e1 which he was expecting to choose by spending cost d.I ft h e
agent succeeds, he enjoys gain α∆b with probability 1 − p1 because he was
expecting to fail with this probability. Similarly, when the agent actually
fails, he suﬀers from loss αγ∆b with probability p1 since he was expecting to
succeed with this probability. These gain and loss correspond to the second
line.
The deﬁnition of the personal equilibrium states that if the agent’s ref-
erence point is the expectation to choose ej and hence to succeed with
probability pj, then he should indeed be willing to choose ej. The reference
point is thus determined endogenously by the agent, anticipating his choice,
and then given the reference point, the agent chooses eﬀort consistent with
his expectation.
3.1 Analysis: The Agent’s Personal Equilibrium
Suppose that the principal oﬀers a contract (bs,b f), which is accepted by
the agent. Given the contract, we analyze the agent’s personal equilibrium.
In the next subsection, we analyze the optimal contract.
There are two candidates for personal equilibria, (e1,p 1)a n d( e0,p 0).12
First consider (e1,p 1). The relevant expected payoﬀs are calculated as fol-
lows:
U(e1,p 1 | e1,p 1)=bf + p1∆b − d + p1(1 − p1)α∆b − (1 − p1)p1αγ∆b
U(e0,p 0 | e1,p 1)=bf + p0∆b + αd + p0(1 − p1)α∆b − (1 − p0)p1αγ∆b
Pair (e1,p 1) is a personal equilibrium if U(e1,p 1 | e1,p 1) ≥ U(e0,p 0 | e1,p 1),
or




1+α + αp1(γ − 1)
(PE1)
12Mixed strategies will be analyzed later in Section 4.
11Next consider (e0,p 0). The following expected payoﬀs are relevant.
U(e0,p 0 | e0,p 0)=bf + p0∆b + p0(1 − p0)α∆b − (1 − p0)p0αγ∆b
U(e1,p 1 | e0,p 0)=bf + p1∆b − d − αγd + p1(1 − p0)α∆b − (1 − p1)p0αγ∆b
Then (e0,p 0) is a personal equilibrium if U(e0,p 0 | e0,p 0) ≥ U(e1,p 1 | e0,p 0),
or




1+α + αp0(γ − 1)
(PE0)
It is easy to show the following results.
Proposition 1. (i) β0 >d / ∆p >β 1. (ii) When contract (bs,b f)i sg i v e n ,
there are three ranges of “incentive intensity” ∆b that characterize personal
equilibria.
(a) If ∆b >β 0,t h e n( e1,p 1) is the only personal equilibrium.
(b) If ∆b <β 1,t h e n( e0,p 0) is the only personal equilibrium.
(c) If β1 ≤ ∆b ≤ β0,b o t h( e0,p 0)a n d( e1,p 1) are personal equilibria.
To understand the results, consider ﬁrst the standard agency model in
which the agent does not exhibit RDP (corresponding to α =0i no u r
model). The agent then prefers to choose e1 if ∆b >d / ∆p,a n dc h o o s ee0
if ∆b <d / ∆p. Proposition 1 (i) then implies that the agent with RDP,
when he expects to choose e1, actually chooses e1 for incentive intensity ∆b
lower than d/∆p, the critical value under the standard case. And the agent,
expecting to choose e0, actually chooses e0 for ∆b higher than d/∆p.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 (i) can be understood as follows. First consider
result d/∆p >β 1. RDP introduce the following positive incentive eﬀects. If
the agent, expecting the outcome to be success with probability p1,chooses
e1 instead of e0, then the chance of “gain” increases from p0(1 − p1)t o
12p1(1−p1), and that of “loss” decreases from (1−p0)p1 to (1−p1)p1.T h e s e
eﬀects reinforce the incentive to choose e1 via incentive pay. On the other
hand, there is a negative eﬀect from RDP. When the agent’s reference eﬀort
is e1,s h i r k i n g( e0) beneﬁts the agent by saving the cost of eﬀort. This eﬀect
is represented by αd. The positive eﬀects dominate because of γ>1, the
agent’s loss aversion.
The intuition behind β0 >d / ∆p is similar. When the agent’s reference
pointis(e0,p 0), e1 is more attractive under RDP than without RDP, because
gain (loss) is more (less, respectively) likely. However, the agent is more
reluctant to choose e1 because he experiences loss αγd. This latter negative
eﬀect dominates because of loss aversion, and thereby the agent chooses e0
even though incentives strong enough to induce e1 are provided for the agent
without RDP.
Figure 1 illustrates three ranges of ∆b in Proposition 1 (ii). An impor-
tant ﬁnding is that in the intermediate range, there are multiple personal
equilibria. In this range, the agent chooses e1 if he expects to do so, while
he chooses e0 if e0 is his expected eﬀort.





13The next proposition reports some comparative statics results.
Proposition 2.
(a) β0 is increasing in α and γ, and decreasing in p1.
(b) β1 is decreasing in α, γ and p1.
(c) β0 − β1 is increasing in α, γ and decreasing in p1.
Proof. Results (a) and (b) directly follow from the deﬁnitions in (PE0) and
(PE1). For (c), the comparative statics results for α and γ are immediate
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(1 + α + αp1(γ − 1))2(1 + α + αp1(γ − 1) − (1 + α))
< 0
As the agent’s preferences are more reference dependent or more averse to
losses, both (e1,p 1)a n d( e0,p 0) are personal equilibria for broader ranges of
incentive intensity, and hence the region where multiple equilibria exist also
enlarges. A more interesting exercise is to examine the eﬀect of p1,w h i c h
we can interpret as a parameter representing the agent’s ability. Higher
eﬀort e1 becomes more attractive to the agent because of higher success
probability by choosing e1. This eﬀect works to reduce both β0 and β1 while
it aﬀects β0 more than β1 because β0 >β 1.F o r( e1,p 1), there is an additional
eﬀect of increasing p1 via the reference point itself: Higher p1 raises the
14probability of the reference being success (and hence the probability of loss),
as well as reduces the probability of the reference being failure (and hence the
probability of gain). Because of loss aversion, the former change dominates,
which change in turn increases the marginal beneﬁt from higher p1.T h e
additional eﬀect thus also works to reduce β1. However, this additional
eﬀect is not large enough to upset the smaller ﬁrst eﬀect on β1 than on β0.
The region where there are multiple equilibria therefore becomes smaller as
the agent has a higher ability.
3.2 Analysis: The Optimal Contract
Now consider the principal’s problem of solving the optimal contract. We
assume that the beneﬁt of success to the principal is so large that she wants
to implement eﬀort e1 with least costs. The principal’s problem is then to
minimize the expected payment bf+p1∆b subject to the agent’s participation
constraint
U(e1,p 1 | e1,p 1) ≥ 0, (PC)
and a condition that the agent chooses (e1,p 1) as a personal equilibrium,
which we call IC (incentive compatibility constraint). (PC) implies that after
observing the principal’s oﬀer, the agent anticipates his reference point and
eﬀort choice. Although the reservation payoﬀ is normalized to zero, all our
results continue to hold under a general reservation payoﬀ U with minor
modiﬁcation.
Constraint (IC) faces a problem of multiple equilibria, but suppose for a
while that ∆b can implement (e1,p 1) as a personal equilibrium. For example,
if the principal sets ∆b a little above β0, then she can guarantee the agent
to play (e1,p 1) since it is the only personal equilibrium.
Given ∆b, the principal wants to minimize the expected payment. By
15(PC), the expected payment is bounded from below since
bf + p1∆b ≥ d + p1(1 − p1)α∆b(γ − 1). (7)
If bf = 0 satisﬁes (7), then (bs,b f)=( ∆ b,0) is the optimal contract. If (7)
does not hold under bf =0 ,t h e nbf is determined by the condition such
that the inequality in (7) is replaced by equality.
Note that the principal’s expected payment is increasing in ∆b:I f( 7 )
does not bind, the agent earns rent, which is increasing in ∆b;a n di f( 7 )
binds, the principal’s expected payment is equal to the right-hand side of
(7), which is increasing in ∆b.
3.3 The Pygmalion and Galatea Eﬀects
Our formulation naturally explains the Galatea eﬀect, one type of “self-
fulﬁlling prophecy” which means that the agent’s self-expectation about his
performance determines his actual performance: If the agent thinks he can
succeed, then he is more likely to succeed. More precisely, Proposition 1
states that the Galatea eﬀect prevails when ∆b ≥ β1 holds.
The Pygmalion eﬀect, on the other hand, involves the principal. The
principal in our model can inﬂuence the personal equilibrium by changing
incentive intensity ∆b.I f s h e s e t s ∆ b a little above β0, then the only per-
sonal equilibrium is (e1,p 1), and hence the agent expects to choose e1 and
succeed with probability p1 (and he does). The principal could also play an
important role in inﬂuencing the agent’s formation of the reference point.
The principal prefers to reduce ∆b further up to β1, if she can make sure the
agent plays (e1,p 1) in the range with multiple equilibria. We can thus say
that the Pygmalion eﬀect, meaning that the agent performs in accordance
with the principal’s expectations, realizes in our model if the principal can
induce the agent to attend to the “right” expectation.
16Note that the principal’s expectation has this role in the region where
multiple equilibria exit. By Proposition 2, this range increases with α, γ,
and decreases with p1, and hence the principal’s expectation is more likely
to matter as the agent is more dependent on the reference point, more averse
to losses, or the agent’s ability is lower. This last property is consistent with
the empirical result that the Pygmalion eﬀect works best for people whose
initial performance level is low (Kierein and Gold, 2000; McNatt, 2000).
One potential obstacle against the principal’s attempt to make the agent
attend to a particular reference point is that the agent himself may con-
sciously choose his preferred equilibrium. The agent’s payoﬀ diﬀerence is
calculated as follows.
U(e1,p 1 | e1,p 1) − U(e0,p 0 | e0,p 0)
=∆ b∆p[1 + α(γ − 1)(p0 + p1) − α(γ − 1)] − d
(8)
We thus obtain the following results.
Proposition 3.
(a) If p1 ≤ 1−p0−(α(γ−1))−1,t h e nU(e1,p 1 | e1,p 1) <U(e0,p 0 | e0,p 0).
(b) If p1 > 1−p0−(α(γ −1))−1,t h e nU(e1,p 1 | e1,p 1) ≥ U(e0,p 0 | e0,p 0)
if and only if




1+α(γ − 1)(p0 + p1) − α(γ − 1)
. (9)
Threshold value ˆ β is decreasing in p1,a n dˆ β<β 0 for suﬃciently large
p1.
Proof. (a) and (9) follow from the right-hand side of (8). (8) also shows that




(1 − p0), (10)
17which is true if p1 → 1.13
If p1 is suﬃciently small (p1 ≤ 1−p0−(α(γ−1))−1), or in the intermediate
range (p1 > 1−p0−(α(γ−1))−1 holds but (10) fails to hold), then the agent
always prefers (e0,p 0)t o( e1,p 1) in the region with multiple equilibria, and
hence the principal’s attempt to make the agent attend to (e1,p 1)m a yn o t
be eﬀective, and she may not be able to lower ∆b below β0.
If p1 is large enough (so that (10) is true), (e1,p 1) may be implementable
with incentive intensity lower than β0, but implementation may be diﬃcult
for ∆b below ˆ β if the agent chooses his preferred equilibrium.
4E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 Mixed Strategies
In the analysis in the previous section, we have focused on pure strategies
(e0 or e1). Now suppose the agent expects to choose e1 with probability q
(and e0 with 1−q). The agent’s expected payoﬀ, when actually choosing e1
with probability s, is given as follows.
U(s | q)= bf + p(s)∆b − sd
− s(1 − q)αγd +( 1− s)qαd
+ p(s)(1 − p(q))α∆b − (1 − p(s))p(q)αγ∆b
where p(x) is the probability of success under mixed strategy x,a n di sg i v e n
by p(x)=xp1 +( 1− x)p0.G i v e n∆ b,( q,p(q)) is a personal equilibrium if
U(q | q) ≥ U(s | q) for all s. This holds if and only if the agent is indiﬀerent
13β1 < ˆ β holds if and only if
1+α
α
(1 − p0) >p 1.
This may or may not hold as p1 → 1.




1+αγ − α(γ − 1)q
1+α + α(γ − 1)p(q)
. (11)
The right-hand side is decreasing in q, and is equal to β0 if q = 0, and is equal
to β1 if q = 1. A unique mixed strategy personal equilibrium thus exists
in the region with multiple equilibria, that is, if ∆b satisﬁes β1 < ∆b <β 0.
Interestingly, as the principal provides stronger incentive intensity, in the
mixed strategy equilibrium the agent is less likely to choose e1:I n c r e a s i n g
∆b leads to e1 being more attractive, and hence q must be reduced to make
e1 and e0 indiﬀerent.
Note that the agent’s expected payoﬀ under the mixed strategy equilib-
rium is between the expected payoﬀs at two pure strategy equilibria. This
is the reason we have focused on pure strategies in the main analysis: it is
unlikely that either the principal or the agent is interested in playing the
mixed strategy equilibrium.
4.2 Continuous Eﬀort
Our main analysis is restricted to the simple case in which there are two
outcomes and two eﬀort levels. In this subsection we continue to assume the
outcome of the project is either success or failure, while we relax the former
restriction and instead assume that the set of feasible eﬀort is continuous.
We supposethat the agent chooses eﬀort e from E =[ 0 ,e]. For simplicity,
the agent’s cost of eﬀort is e. The project succeeds with probability p(e),
which we assume twice-continuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes p (e) > 0
and p  (e) < 0 for all e. When the agent expects to choose e (and succeed
with probability p(e)) and actually chooses ˆ e ≤ e, his expected payoﬀ is
19given as follows.
U(ˆ e | e)=bf + p(ˆ e)∆b − ˆ e
+ p(ˆ e)(1 − p(e))α∆b − (1 − p(ˆ e))p(e)αγ∆b
+ α(e − ˆ e).
The ﬁrst-order condition for the agent to choose e is given by
p (e)(1 + α + α(γ − 1)p(e))∆b ≥ 1+α. (12)
Similarly, the agent’s expected payoﬀ, when he chooses ˆ e ≥ e,i s
U(ˆ e | e)=bf + p(ˆ e)∆b − ˆ e
+ p(ˆ e)(1 − p(e))α∆b − (1 − p(ˆ e))p(e)αγ∆b
− αγ(ˆ e − e).
The ﬁrst-order condition is given by
p (e)(1 + α + α(γ − 1)p(e))∆b ≤ 1+αγ. (13)
If the principal wants to implement e, then by setting ∆b satisfying
both (12) and (13), she can induce e to be a personal equilibrium for the
agent. Although there is the multiple equilibrium problem as before, we
here suppose that the agent attends to the equilibrium the principal prefers
most, in order to explore the interaction between personal equilibria and
incentives. Since the principal prefers lower ∆b,i ti so p t i m a lf o rh e rt os e t






1+α + α(γ − 1)p(e)
(14)








α(γ − 1){p(e)p  (e)+( p (e))2} + p  (e)(1 + α)
	
(15)
20First consider the agent with the standard reference-independent prefer-
ences (α = 0). Then from (15) it is easy to see ∆b is increasing in e:Am o r e
powerful incentive intensity is needed for implementation of a higher eﬀort.
This is a standard result. Now suppose the agent has RDP (α>0). (15)
then does not tell us whether or not ∆b is increasing. In other words, there
is a possibility that the optimal incentive intensity decreases with eﬀort.14
The agent expecting a higher eﬀort as a reference point faces a higher chance
of loss and a lower chance of gain. Because of loss aversion, the former eﬀect
dominates, and hence the agent is more motivated to choose a higher eﬀort.
If this eﬀect is suﬃciently large, the principal can save monetary incentives,
and lower ∆b is optimal.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present the agency model with RDP to explain both the
Pygmalion and Galatea eﬀects. We ﬁrst show that the agent’s higher ex-
pectation enables the principal to implement high eﬀort with lower-powered
incentives. Our agent evaluates his future choice based on his expectation
as a reference point. The agent with higher self-expectation is thus going to
perform better. We interpret this as the Galatea eﬀect. We also show that
when the power of incentives is intermediate, multiple equilibria exist. The
principal wants to make the agent attend to high eﬀort in the region with
multiple equilibria, and we interpret the Pygmalion eﬀect as an equilibrium
selection device.
It is crucial for us to take the viewpoint that the reference point is
the agent’s expectation. However, there is an alternative interpretation
of reference points based on the goal setting theory in social psychology
14We can construct an example such that ∆b is decreasing in all e.
21(Locke and Latham, 2002). The goal setting theory shows that goals enhance
performance by aﬀecting reference points. It is easy to modify our model
such that the reference point is the goal set by the principal. We can then
show that it is optimal for the principal to choose the highest eﬀort level as
the reference point. This line of research may also be helpful to explain the
Pygmalion eﬀect.
As we have seen in the introduction, much research in social psychology,
management, and so on, including laboratory and ﬁeld studies, shows that
the Pygmalion eﬀect is signiﬁcant. By contrast, there exists little economic
research on the Pygmalion eﬀect as far as we know. However, we believe
that the Pygmalion eﬀect also brings rich economic implications. We hope
our paper stimulates future economic research, especially experimental one,
on the Pygmalion eﬀect, or more generally, self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
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